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INTRODUCTION: PROPERTY IN ECOLOGY 
Are property rights in ecological resources compatible with environmental 
protection? Might they be essential? 
From the late nineteenth century to the present, leading conservationists 
and environmental thinkers have warned of the threat posed to ecological 
sustainability by private property rights, particularly where embedded within a 
system of market exchange.1 Pervasive ecological interconnection has often been 
viewed as fundamentally incompatible with the private division and segmentation 
of the landscape into separately divisible private tracts.2 
The nation’s first national forest reserves were created in 1891 to protect 
against the threat of market-driven over-consumption.3 The early push for greater 
federal ownership and management of resource-abundant lands by the likes of 
Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot was fed by persistent fears of timber 
shortages due to the rapacious resource consumption of timber companies and 
private forest owners.4 At the turn of the last century, President Roosevelt warned: 
“If the present rate of forest destruction is allowed to continue, with nothing to 
offset it, a timber famine in the future is inevitable.”5 Pinchot, the father of the 
United States Forest Service, offered an equally dismal assessment: “The United 
States has already crossed the verge of a timber famine so severe that its blighting 
effects will be felt by every household in the land.”6 The answer, for Pinchot, was 
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 1. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, The Problem with Ploughshares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1992, at A27 
(“Environmentalism’s essential message is that private ownership rights go too far”); Joseph L. Sax, 
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 (1971) (suggesting environmental 
protection requires “a reconsideration of the notion of property rights”); Rory O’Brien, Law Property, 
and the Environment, in THINKING ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT: READINGS ON POLITICS, PROPERTY AND 
THE PHYSICAL WORLD 57, 57 (Matthew Alan Cahn & Rory O’Brien eds., 1996) (“Defining property as 
something that is privately held immediately impacts the environment.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Constitutional Dimensions of Property: A Debate, 26 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 23, 32 (1992) (noting ecological interconnection presents “the most profound challenge ever 
presented to established notions of property”); see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269 (1993). 
 3. See STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, NATURE’S KEEPERS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NATURE MANAGEMENT 
55 (1995). 
 4. See ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
MANAGEMENT 51-52 (1995). 
 5. See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, AMERICANS AND THEIR FORESTS: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY 441 
(1992) (quoting Roosevelt’s address at the 1905 American Forestry Congress). 
 6. See GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION (1910), 
https://wwnorton.com/college/history/america-essential-learning/docs/GPinchot-Conservation-1910.pdf. 
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“government control of cutting on all timberland, private as well as public.” The 
private sector could not be trusted. Accordingly, President Roosevelt took 
aggressive action (often without Congressional support) to expand federal land 
management in the name of conservation.7 
As federal land management responsibilities accumulated, expanding 
beyond forests to include what would become National Parks, “the overriding 
philosophy was one of saving resources from the rapaciousness of private 
commercial interests.”8 Due to the perceived threat posed by private consumption, 
conservation leaders “frequently supported public or social ownership of the 
environment: the national park idea, for example, and federal control of dams or 
major rivers.”9 As Pinchot would explain, “[w]e are coming to understand in this 
country that public action for public benefit has a very much wider field to cover 
and a much larger part to play than was the case when there were resources enough 
for everyone.”10 Public ownership and control was prescribed to cure market-
driven scarcity. 
Skepticism of property rights continued to influence the development of 
environmental policy throughout much of the Twentieth Century. As governments 
at all levels adopted more expansive environmental regulatory measures in the 
1960s and 1970s, there was a particular focus on the potential threat property 
rights, and the constitutional protection thereof, could pose to the achievement of 
environmental goals.11 As a Presidential Task Force advised in 1973, in order to 
“protect critical environmental and cultural areas, tough restrictions will have to be 
placed on the use of privately owned land.”12 
Although many environmental thought leaders have been skeptical of 
property-based institutions, there is a strong tradition in the United States of 
utilizing private property for conservation purposes.13 The same period that saw a 
 
 7. See Julia L. Ernst, The Legacy of Theodore Roosevelt’s Approach to Governmental Powers, 92 
N.D. L. REV. 309, 318-20 (2017). 
 8. See BUDIANSKY, supra note 3, at 142; see also THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 422 (1985 ed. 1913) (“The Conservation movement was a direct 
outgrowth of the forest movement. It was nothing more than the application to our other natural 
resources of the principles which had been worked out in connection with the forests. Without the basis 
of public sentiment which had been built up for the protection of the forests, and without the example of 
public foresight in the protection of this, one of the greatest natural resources, the Conservation 
movement would have been impossible.”). 
 9. Roderick Frazier Nash, The Potential of Environmental History, in AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTALISM: READINGS IN CONSERVATION HISTORY 4 (3d ed. 1990). 
 10. See PINCHOT, supra note 6 (“We are coming to understand in this country that public action for 
public benefit has a very much wider field to cover and a much larger part to play than was the case 
when there were resources enough for every one.”); JOHN T. CUMBLER, NORTHEAST AND MIDWEST 
UNITED STATES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 238 (ABC-CLIO, 2005). 
 11. See Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property 
Rights and Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 988, 993-1001 (2005). 
 12. THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZEN’S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 23 (William K. Reilly ed., 
1973). 
 13. See Council on Envtl. Quality, Special Report: The Public Benefits of Private Conservation, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1984 (1984) (surveying history of private conservation in the United 
States); see also Andrew P. Morriss, Private Conservation Literature: A Survey, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
621 (2004). 
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Progressive push for greater federal land ownership and resource management was 
witness to a dramatic expansion of private conservation activity. Roosevelt himself, 
who was heavily influenced by Pinchot and oversaw the creation of the U.S. Forest 
Service, had a hand in creating the Boone and Crockett Club in 1887.14 The first 
local Audubon Society was founded in 1886, and, in 1905, the National Committee 
of Audubon Societies (which would eventually become the National Audubon 
Society) was born.15 Audubon sought to preserve essential habitat for bird species 
through direct ownership. This often included targeting lands deemed valueless, or 
even dangerous, by government experts, such as “swamps.”16 
While Audubon was building its network of reserves, the federal 
government was subsidizing wetland destruction.17 Similarly, while the federal 
government was encouraging the slaughter of buffalo, foresighted conservationists 
used private ownership as a means to preserve the American bison.18 As 
conservationist Valerius Geist observed, “Bison were initially saved by six 
individuals who either saw business opportunities in the existence of bison or 
simply wanted to save a vanishing species.”19 Private conservation preserved what 
government management would have slighted. 
The expansion of environmental regulation in the last third of the 
twentieth century did not diminish the importance of private conservation in 
America. To the contrary, private conservation has continued to expand, in some 
cases filling the gaps and interstices left within the regulatory regimes. The 
American Prairie Reserve is but one example of a non-governmental organization 
using private ownership to extend conservation beyond governmental efforts.20 It is 
now increasingly common for environmental experts to acknowledge the “many 
exciting possibilities for using property concepts to further the protection of 
environmental resources.”21 
 
 14. See PAUL RUSSELL CUTRIGHT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE MAKING OF A CONSERVATIONIST 
167-69 (1985) (discussing the founding of the Boone & Crockett Club). On Roosevelt’s embrace of 
conservation, see ROOSEVELT, supra note 8. 
 15. See FRANK GRAHAM JR. & CARL W. BUCHEISTER, THE AUDUBON ARK: A HISTORY OF THE 
AUDUBON SOCIETY (1st ed. 1990). 
 16. See BUDIANSKY, supra note 3, at 28 (“What we today admire as ‘wetlands’ were once 
‘swamps,’ or even, in the words of the eighteenth-century naturalist Georges Leclerc, the Comte do 
Buffon, ‘putrid and stagnating waters.”). As Budiansky notes, eighteenth-century naturalists such as 
Leclerc often has similarly negative views of forests. Id. 
 17. See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 19-20 (1999). 
 18. See generally ANDREW C. ISENBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BISON: AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
HISTORY 164-92 (2000); Ike C. Sugg, Why the Buffalo Roam, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Jan. 31, 
2000), https://cei.org/news-letters-cei-planet/why-buffalo-roam; see also STEFAN BECHTEL, MR. 
HORNADAY’S WAR: HOW A PECULIAR VICTORIAN ZOOKEEPER WAGED A LONELY CRUSADE FOR 
WILDLIFE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2012). 
 19. Sugg, supra note 18. 
 20. See James L. Huffman, American Prairie Reserve Protecting Wildlife Habitat on a Grand 
Scale, 59 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (2019). 
 21. Carol Rose, Property Rights and Responsibilities, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT 
GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 49, 57 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); see 
also Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38 
IDAHO L. REV.. 453, 459 (2002) (noting the “increasing recognition of the need for non-regulatory 
Winter 2019 INTRODUCTION xiii 
Working at the local level, conservationists have often rediscovered Aldo 
Leopold’s counsel that private rights can be more effective than government 
regulation.22 Conservation goals have been dramatically enhanced by the growth of 
land trusts23 and increasing use of property instruments such as conservation 
easements.24 Land ownership in fee simple is one way a conservation organization 
may protect a particular place, but it is hardly necessary in many contexts. 
Conservation easements and other partial interests in land are often a highly cost-
effective alternative, particularly where conservation is compatible with other land-
uses.25 Over the past several decades, the use of such tools has expanded 
dramatically, facilitated by legal reforms that have facilitated and encouraged such 
efforts.26 
The ecological value of ownership is found not only in land, but in water 
as well.27 Western water law traditionally required landowners to make “productive 
use” of water rights to retain them, such as by diverting water for agriculture or 
 
approaches to private land conservation”); Federico Cheever, Property Rights and the Maintenance of 
Wildlife Habitat: The Case for Conservation Land Transactions, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 431 (2002) (arguing 
that “some of the inherent qualities of the legal institutions we call property make that type of institution 
more suitable for the maintenance of wildlife habitat than the legal institutions we call regulation”); 
James L. Huffman, Marketing Biodiversity, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 421 (2002) (“Only recently have some 
mainstream environmental groups embraced the idea that property rights and private markets can 
promote environmental protection.”). 
 22. Aldo Leopold, Conservation Economics, in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 193, 193-94 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicott eds, 1991) (“We tried to get conservation by 
buying land, by subsidizing desirable changes in land use, and by passing restrictive laws. The last 
method largely failed; the other two have produced some small samples of success.”). Leopold further 
suggested that private conservation was preferable to government acquisition of land for conservation 
purposes. Id. at 196. (“I do challenge the growing assumption that bigger buying [of public land] is a 
substitute for private conservation practice.”). Id. 
 23. See generally Jessica Owley & Adena R. Rissman, Trends in Private Land Conservation: 
Increasing Complexity, Shifting Conservation Purposes and Allowable Private Land Uses, 51 LAND 
USE POL’Y 76, 76-77 (2016) (discussing growth in land trusts); see also RICHARD BREWER, 
CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003). 
 24. See Peter M. Morrisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the 
Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373 (2001); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held 
Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 
63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984). 
 25. See, e.g., Dominic Parker, Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership 
or Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 483, 516 (2004) (explaining that conservation 
easements “better facilitate gains from [landowner] specialization” because they can “conserve 
environmental amenities while continuing to allow landowners the right to produce non-conservation 
output” and that such arrangements can be “especially cost-effective”). Of course, conservation 
easements, like any policy tool, are not without their potential drawbacks. See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney, 
The Illusion of Perpetuity and the Preservation of Privately Owned Lands, 44 NAT. RESOURCE J. 573 
(2004) (suggesting that perpetual land preservation could frustrate conservation in the future as 
environmental priorities change over time); Jamie Sayen, Limitations of Conservation Easements, WILD 
EARTH, Spring 1996, at 77 (suggesting that fee simple ownership provides greater protection for some 
resources than a conservation easement). 
 26. See Owley & Rissman, supra note 23, at 77. 
 27. See Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, The “Shift to Privatization” in Land Conservation: A 
Cautionary Essay, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 599, 600 (2002) (“[P]roperty rights are being created to 
address new environmental challenges, like air and water pollution, that previously have been regulated 
in a less market-based, more command-and-control manner.”). 
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livestock. This requirement was intended to ensure that scarce water was used in 
(what were historically considered to be) socially beneficial uses.28 A landowner 
who left her water in the stream for the benefit of fish or other species risked losing 
her water rights to those who used water for irrigation or drinking.29 By limiting the 
marketability of water, the traditional legal regime diminished the incentives to 
increase water efficiency and obstructed conservation efforts.30 
Over the past few decades, however, this has begun to change as states 
have begun to embrace a broader conception of property in water, and recognize 
property interests in instream water flows.31 Oregon, for example, allows 
individuals to purchase, lease, or donate water rights for instream flows.32 This 
enables conservation organizations, such as Oregon’s Oregon Water Trust, “to use 
the marketplace to purchase existing water rights and convert them” for the benefit 
of fish.33 The recognition of legally defensible property rights in instream flows 
means there is a broader market for water, and conservation organizations may 
negotiate with existing water owners for voluntary transfers, increasing the 
incentive for more efficient water use.34 As the use of water rights has expanded, so 
has the volume of water traded and reallocated to alternative uses.35 The ability of 
water markets to facilitate the efficient and relatively rapid reallocation of water in 
response to changing ecological conditions is also now seen as one way to address 
some of the likely consequences of climate change.36 
The rediscovery of the ecological value of property rights should not come 
as a surprise. As the late Robert Nelson observed, “the great advantage of 
privatization is that it creates a set of people with strong personal stakes in 
achieving good results on the land.”37 Wendell Berry, though not a proponent of 
 
 28. See Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet Revolution in Federal and Tribal 
Minimum Streamflows, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 445, 446 n.1 (1992) ( “Limiting water rights to those who 
could make productive use of the water--and only for as long as they did so (nonuse can lead to loss of 
the right through abandonment or forfeiture)--was designed to conserve scarce Western water for those 
who were making productive investments such as irrigation, mining, and stock watering.”). 
 29. Id. at 480; see also TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPITALISTS: DOING 
GOOD BY DOING WELL 105 (1997). 
 30. See Christopher L. Len, Synthesis - A Brand New Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 55, 
64 (2004) (discussing the effects of prior appropriation doctrine on water use); see also James L. 
Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation States: A Model for the East, 21 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 429, 438 (2004). 
 31. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE 
PUMP 111-32 (1997); see also Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Terry Anderson, Principles for 
Water, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 335 (2002); Janet Neuman, Anne Squier & Gail Achterman, Sometimes a 
Great Notion: Oregon’s Instream Flow Experiments, 36 ENVTL. L. 1125 (2006). 
 32. Neuman, Squier & Achterman supra note 31 (discussing evolution of water law in Oregon). 
 33. See Janet C. Neuman, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The First Ten Years of the Oregon 
Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. REV. 432 (2004) (discussing the work of the Oregon Water Trust and its 
history). 
 34. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 29, at 94-95. 
 35. See Jedidiah Bewer, et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987-2005, 40 U. MICH. 
J. L. REFORM 1021, 1042, fig.2 (2007) (documenting increase in water transfers over time). 
 36. See Jonathan H. Adler, Water Rights, Markets, and Changing Ecological Conditions, 42 ENVTL 
L. 93, 106-12 (2012). 
 37. NELSON, supra note 4. 
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classical liberal values or free market capitalism, nonetheless recognized that “the 
best conserver of land in use will always be the small owner or operator, farmer or 
forester or both, who lives within a securely placed family and community, who 
knows how to use the land in the best way, and who can afford to do so.”38 He 
similarly counseled that “a large population of small property holders” offers the 
best hope for “good stewardship of land.”39 
There is significant empirical evidence that greater protection of private 
property rights correlates with higher levels of environmental quality. Comparative 
assessments of privately and publicly owned resources, such as oyster beds, tend to 
find private owners manage resources more efficiently and effectively.40 Cross-
country comparisons find that “environmental quality and economic growth rates 
are greater in regimes where property rights are well defined than in regimes where 
property rights are poorly defined.”41 As a general matter, those natural resources 
subject to property institutions are managed more sustainably and in better 
condition than those subject to political management or left in open-access 
commons. 
The empirical evidence confirms one of the more important, and often 
overlooked, insights of Garrett Hardin’s seminal essay, “The Tragedy of the 
Commons.”42 This essay is often remembered for its justification for environmental 
regulation – what he termed “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” (or for 
Hardin’s concerns about population growth).43 What is too often forgotten was his 
explanation of how the recognition of property rights in ecological resources 
facilitates conservation. 
In his essay, Hardin described the fate of the “commons,” an unowned, 
open-access pasture used for grazing livestock.44 As Hardin explained, it is in the 
self-interest of each livestock owner to maximize her use of the commons, even 
though doing so may increase the depletion of the underlying resource. Each 
livestock owner captures that full benefit of putting an additional animal out to 
graze. The costs to the resource, however, are distributed among all of the users. 
Put another way, due to the open-access nature of the commons, the benefits of 
using the pasture are privatized, while the costs are socialized. This dynamic, 
Hardin explained, “brings ruin to all.”45 
 
 38. See Wendell Berry, Private Property and the Common Wealth, in ANOTHER TURN OF THE 
CRANK 59 (1995). It is important to note, however, that Berry does not endorse a classical liberal 
conception of property. See Nathaniel Stewart, The Tragedy of the Commonwealth and the Vision of 
Wendell Berry, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 465 (2006). 
 39. Berry, supra note 38, at 49. 
 40. See Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelly, Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster 
Industry, 18 J. L. & ECON. 521 (1975); Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelly, Prices and 
Property Rights in the Fisheries, 42.2 S. ECON. J. 253 (1979). For a survey of other comparative 
analyses, see Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, 
CONFLICT, AND LAW 90-111 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003). 
 41. See Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the Environment, and Economic Well-Being, in WHO 
OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 51 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998). 
 42. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 43. Id. at 1247. 
 44. Id. at 1244. 
 45. Id. 
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It’s worth reiterating that Hardin was not the first to explain this 
phenomenon. Fishery economists detailed and documented this precise problem in 
the marine commons decades earlier.46 Aristotle also described the general 
dynamic, as did others in between.47 Yet Hardin’s essay is important because it 
popularized the idea of the “tragedy of the commons,” and helped inform the 
emerging environmentalist moment in American politics. 
Hardin’s call for controlling access and limiting the use of common 
resources – land, water, air – reinforced the push for greater environmental 
regulation. What is too-often overlooked is that Hardin offered an alternative to 
prescriptive government regulation: private property. As he explained, the tragedy 
of the commons “is averted by private property, or something formally like it.”48 
Indeed, Hardin suggested this was one of the primary functions of property in 
land.49 
As Hardin recognized, where property rights are well-defined and secure, 
the tragedy of the commons is less likely since each owner has ample incentive to 
act as a steward, caring for the underlying resource and preventing its overuse 
which then benefits both the owners as well as others who may value the 
underlying resource. In this way, the institution of property rights “deters us from 
exhausting the positive resources of the earth.”50 
Fisheries provide a useful case study of the logic of the commons and the 
value of property institutions. Following World War II, ecologists began to 
recognize that the ocean’s bounty, once seen as limitless, was under strain. 
Beginning in the 1950s, fishery economists explained how this was an inevitable 
consequence of the open-access nature of marine resources. Further, as Hardin 
would later suggest, they recognized property rights as a solution.51 
The development of ITQs (for “individual transferable quotas”) and other 
forms of property-based fishery management systems, known as catch shares, 
many marine fisheries once threatened with collapse are on the road to 
sustainability.52 The adoption of such programs has increased fishing industry 
efficiency, reduced over-capitalization, and lessened the ecological impact of 
 
 46. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The 
Fishery, 62(2) J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole 
Ownership, 63(2) J. POL ECON. 116 (1955). 
 47. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS § 1261.b32, at 108 (Trevor J. Saunders ed., T.A. Sinclair 
trans., Penguin Classics rev. ed. 1981) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
 48. Hardin, supra note 42, at 1245. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See FRANCIS T. CHRISTY, FISHERMEN QUOTAS: A TENTATIVE SUGGESTION FOR DOMESTIC 
MANAGEMENT (1973). This history is summarized in Ragnar Arnason, Property Rights in Fisheries: 
How Much Can Individual Transferable Quotas Accomplish?, 6(2) REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 217 
(2012). 
 52. See Christopher Costello, Steven D. Gaines, & John Lynham, Can Catch Shares Prevent 
Fisheries Collapse?, 321 SCI. 1678 (2008) (noting the adoption of catch-share programs “halts, and 
even reverses, the global trend toward widespread [fisheries] collapse”). 
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fishing operations.53 Such programs cover only two percent or so of fish stocks 
around the world, but as of 2010 accounted for approximately twenty-five percent 
of the volume of fish caught annually worldwide.54 Another study, surveying over 
200 peer-reviewed papers on the environmental effects of ITQ programs, found 
that the creation of property rights in ocean fisheries encourages greater 
stewardship among fishery participants, including efforts to maintain and enforce 
sustainable limits on the total catch.55 Fishery participants under ITQs often exhibit 
greater concern for ensuring total catch levels remain sustainable and that 
applicable limits are enforced than the government officials charged with such 
obligations. 
The experience with fisheries suggests the value of learning how property 
rights may be extended to threatened ecological resources, particularly those we 
wish to simultaneously exploit and conserve. The experience also suggests how 
challenging such efforts can be. Only decades after fishery economists began to 
identify potential mechanisms for the extension of property rights to fisheries did 
such reforms begin to get adopted, and only recently – in the past decade or so – 
has conclusive empirical evidence on the value of these approaches emerged. 
Following this model for other resources will take no less effort, and the 
vindication of classical liberal ideas about how to protect other resources is by no 
means assured. 
While Hardin embraced the conservation potential of property rights in 
principle, he was not altogether sanguine about the potential for property rights to 
avert the tragedy of the commons across the board. However much property rights 
led to increased conservation and agricultural productivity on land, Hardin feared 
that it would be difficult to define and defend property rights in other ecological 
contexts.56 It is one thing to post and fence private land. It is quite another to 
demarcate property rights in air or water or to prevent the overuse of such resources 
as pollution sinks by ever-growing populations.57 
Embracing Hardin’s analysis does not require embracing his pessimistic 
outlook. Much has changed in the half-century since Hardin wrote, and there are 
many reasons to be more bullish about the potential for property in ecology. As the 
experience with rights in water and fisheries noted above highlights,58 institutional 
evolution, aided by technological innovation, can facilitate the recognition and 
protection of property rights in ecologically important resources and produce 
conservation benefits.59 
 
 53. The relevant literature is summarized in Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Learning How 
to Fish: Catch Shares and the Future of Fishery Conservation, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 150 
(2013). 
 54. See Christopher Costello et al., Economic Incentives and Global Fisheries Sustainability, 2 
ANN. REV. RES. ECON. 299, 302 (2010). 
 55. Trevor A. Branch, How Do Individual Transferable Quotas Affect Marine Ecosystems?, 10 
FISH & FISHERIES 39 (2009). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among 
Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 128-29 (2001) (explaining 
how changes in technology can facilitate the definition and enforcement of property rights); see 
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Yet Hardin was no doubt correct that the extension of property-based 
institutions to a wider array of ecological resources is a serious challenge. 
Demarcating boundaries on land is easier than delineating rights in water. A given 
parcel can generally be relied upon to remain in place. Living resources, including 
wildlife, not so much. As a consequence, property rights in ecological resources are 
incomplete. In some cases, ownership of resources is prohibited by law. In other 
cases, the transaction costs of extending well defined, defensible, and divestible 
property rights appear greater than the benefits to be gained. 
The papers in this volume explore the further potential for property-based 
institutions to preserve environmental values and enhance environmental 
protection. Through case studies, empirical assessments, and consideration of the 
institutional constraints that may alternatively facilitate or hamper private 
conservation efforts, these papers deepen our understanding of the institutional 
context in which conservation occurs and the potential for property-based 
approaches to supplement, if not supplant, traditional government management of 
natural resources and environmental regulation. Together, they aim to enhance the 
conservation potential of property institutions by looking at how such institutions 
may be extended and defended so as to maximize property’s ecological potential. 
Government agencies may seem to have a comparative advantage at 
landscape-scale conservation   ̶ perhaps. But the work of the American Prairie 
Reserve (“APR”) might suggest otherwise.60 Just as the early Audubon Society 
conserved areas often left unprotected by governments at the time, the APR is well 
on its way to creating the largest nature reserve in the country by acquiring land 
from willing sellers. At the same time, APR is modifying the management of 
federally owned lands by seeking to acquire and retire grazing permits. 
One purpose of land conservation is to preserve habitat and intact 
ecosystems. Another is to provide for recreational opportunities. The latter need not 
require the acquisition of land in fee-simple, or even the purchase of a permanent 
conservation easement. The combination of private ownership and modern 
technology may facilitate temporary leases or access rights so as to enable a “right 
to roam” across private lands – what some might think of as the environmental 
equivalent of Airbnb.61 
Water may be more difficult to own than land, as discussed above. Yet the 
application of property rights principles to water has produced conservation gains. 
This is even true where such rights are incomplete or where transaction costs 
inhibit the transfer of existing rights. The Colorado Water Conservation Board 
(“CWCB”) has been able to work within the existing water right structure to 
enhance stream protection within the state, even though significant obstacles to 
water transfers remain.62 
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As the activities of the CWCB and APR both demonstrate, private owners 
are not necessarily the only players within a property rights framework. 
Government agencies may continue to own ecological resources and use property 
institutions to advance broader public or political goals. Yet just because lands or 
waters are characterized as belonging to the state does not make it so and claims of 
state “ownership” should be approached with caution, not least because of the 
state’s dual role as owner and regulator.63 
State laws and regulations often determine what sorts of property rights 
will be recognized and, in particular, whether “non-use” rights in ecological 
resources are possible. It took decades for such rights in water – instream rights – 
to obtain legal recognition, and there are still obstacles to the recognition of 
equivalent rights in other contexts. As a consequence, the limitation on non-use 
rights in ecological resources remains a major challenge for property-based 
preservation.64 
At the same time that recognition of non-use rights is important, so, too, is 
careful consideration of what uses interfere with the property rights of others. For 
decades, the dominant environmental paradigm has focused on the idea of 
“externalities” – the “external” effects one person’s use of her property may have 
on that of another – and the use of government interventions (such as taxes or 
regulations) to “internalize” such costs. Yet due to pervasive ecological 
interconnection, the idea of externalities threatens to swallow the very property 
rights foundation upon which it sits, necessitating a more careful and principled 
application of this essential concept.65 
Private property has an essential role to play in environmental 
conservation. Yet as this essay and the accompanying papers show, there are many 
areas in which the precise role for property has yet to be defined or may seem out 
of reach. Important questions remain about the best set of institutional 
arrangements and legal rules to facilitate the extension and preservation of property 
rights without compromising efficiency or equity. Such “second generation” 
questions are an important as ever and command the attention of those interested in 
property-based environmental protection.66 
Environmental protection is necessarily a work in progress – as it has 
always been and always will be. Human civilization inevitably produces untoward 
environmental consequences. Changes in scientific understanding and social values 
also change what types and degrees of environmental protection people demand 
over time. Property rights have an important role to play in this process, and 
continuing research on property rights questions is necessary if people are to have 
the opportunity to achieve the types of environmental protection they deserve. 
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